Showing posts with label evil. Show all posts
Showing posts with label evil. Show all posts

Sunday, March 13, 2016

Crazy crap Ted Cruz actually said about being one Supreme Court Justice away from death, Christianity and BBQ

@daveweigel @washingtonpost #tedcruz #HavanaTed one justice away from ... end of the world

UPDATED: March 16, 2016 - Obama just nominated Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Merrick Garland for the Supreme Court vacancy. Ted Cruz just released ridiculous news that he will not hear or vote on any candidate put forth by Obama. Cruz even stated that if Donald Trump were President, he would nominate someone "like" Merrick Garland. Trump did not make this nomination! Trump never mentioned this guy. President Obama has every right and duty to nominate a #SCOTUS Justice! Cruz said "let the people decide." They did when they voted for Obama for President. Cruz again said if someone other than Cruz nominates a Justice the "second amendment will be abolished. Abortion including late term abortion will be legal everywhere. Christians will go to prison. Veterans graves will be sandblasted and bulldozed..." Ted Cruz is full on nuts and should never be President. He shouldn't even be in the senate.

Things Ted Cruz actually said about the potential Supreme Court Justice nominee aka "CruzCrud" *

  • “One more justice on the left and the Second Amendment is written out of the Bill of Rights."
  • "One more justice away from Christians going to prison."
  • “We are one liberal justice away from the Supreme Court striking down every meaningful restriction put on abortion over the last 40 years. We are one justice away from the Supreme Court mandating unlimited abortion on demand up until the point of delivery with taxpayer funding and no parental notification.”
  • "We're just steps away from the chisels at Arlington coming out to remove crosses and stars of David from tombstones."
  • "One U.S. Supreme Court justice away from having religious liberty abolished."
  • "We are one liberal justice away from the Supreme Court ruling that government can take our religious liberty away and force every one of us to violate our faith on penalty of prison."
  • "We are one liberal justice away from the Supreme Court ordering Ten Commandments monuments torn down all over this country."
  • "One more justice away from our freedoms being gone for a generation."
  • “We are one liberal justice away from a five justice liberal majority, the likes of which this country has never seen.”
  • "One liberal justice away from no guns."
  • “One more justice on the left and our religious liberty is gone for a generation.”
  • "One liberal justice away from a reinterpretation of the Second Amendment, the demolition of veterans' memorials and Americans being subject to international criminal courts."
  • "One more liberal Supreme Court justice and our right to keep and bear arms is taken away from us by an activist court."
  • "One more liberal justice and they begin sandblasting and bulldozing veterans memorials throughout this country."
  • “One more liberal justice, and the Supreme Court will effectively write the 2nd Amendment out of the Constitution. It would mean that the government could ban firearms, and not a single person here would have any individual right to challenge that illegal ruling in court.”
  • "One more liberal justice and we lose our sovereignty to the United Nations and the World Court."
  • "We’re One Liberal Justice Away from Major Gun Control"
  • “One Liberal Justice Away From Irreparable Damage”
  • "One justice away from a liberal Supreme Court causing enough damage for the nation to become unrecognizable."
  • "One Justice Away from a … Radical, Left-Wing Majority, the Likes of Which This Country’s Never Seen."
  • "We are one liberal justice away from the court mandating that Ten Commandment monuments be torn down in courthouses and city halls and public parks all over this country."
  • "We are one liberal justice away from" (insert something you really like here such as freedom of speech, Nascar, watermelon, cheap domestic beer, subsidized dairy/meat, BBQ, babies, money, sex, air, water...)
* These are exact quotes taken from major media articles which cite videos of Ted Cruz actually stating these crazy, impossible things. No Supreme Court Justice can get rid of the bill of rights, constitution, second amendment, bulldoze tombstones of veterans... This is Ted Cruz' fear-mongering religious politics.

Mary Cummins of Animal Advocates is a wildlife rehabilitator licensed by the California Department of Fish and Game. Mary Cummins is also a licensed real estate appraiser in Los Angeles, California.

Mary Cummins, Mary K. Cummins, Mary Katherine Cummins, Mary Cummins-Cobb, Mary, Cummins, Cobb, real estate, appraiser, appraisal, instructor, teacher, Los Angeles, Santa Monica, Beverly Hills, Pasadena, Brentwood, Bel Air, California, licensed, permitted, single family, condo, pud, hud, fannie mae, freddie mac, uspap, certified, residential, certified resident, apartment building, multi-family, commercial, industrial, expert witness, civil, criminal, orea, dre, insurance, bonded, experienced, bilingual, spanish, english, form, 1004, 2055, land, raw, acreage, vacant, insurance, cost, income approach, market analysis, comparative, theory, appraisal theory, cost approach, sales, matched pairs, plot, plat, map, diagram, photo, photographs, photography, rear, front, street, subject, comparable, sold, listed, active, pending, expired, cancelled, listing, mls, multiple listing service, claw, themls,

Saturday, February 14, 2015

James, Catherine Emmi vs Chapman University, Jim Doti - non-profit donor fraud

Jim Doti Chapman University, James Emmi, Catherine Emmi

I heard about this story earlier today when I was researching how people donate to universities. This LA Times article sums it up. Jim Doti representing Chapman University started asking wealthy James and Catherine Emmi for donations. Over the years Jim Doti asked for more and more. Finally the Emmis said no. Jim Doti knowing that James Emmi was 98 and not quite all there then took advantage of his diminishing condition and had him sign an irrevocable bequest agreement to give $12,000,000. The Emmis are suing to get back their first installment donation and $3,000,000 in damages. What Jim Doti did as per this lawsuit is disgusting. Jim Doti wined and dined the couple, gave them awards, lots of positive press, invited them to events, put the husband on a board...all to butter them up to fleece the couple. Jim Doti took advantage of a generous, wealthy old man. Sickening.

http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-newport-couple-want-donation-back-1-20150213-story.html

Below is just the text of the body of the lawsuit. I omitted the causes of action as they were repetitive. You just need to read the general allegations. Complaint 30-2015-00769986 Judge Linda Marks. Here is the file as pdf.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxE8KfVPjYF4dlJrOTdydGY4MDA/view?usp=sharing

James G. Bohm (SBN 132430)
jbohm@bohmwildish.com
Annie Ventocilla Won, Esq. (SBN 249719)
Aventocilla@bohmwildish.com
BOHM WILDISH LLP
Park Tower, Suite 700
695 Town Center Drive
Costa Mesa, California 92626
Telephone: (714) 384-6500
Facsimile: (714) 384-6501
Attorneys for Plaintiffs,

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE – CENTRAL DISTRICT

JAMES EMMI, an individual; and
CATHERINE EMMI, an individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY, a California
nonprofit corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive,
Defendant.
CASE NO.:
[UNLIMITED JURISDICTION]
COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFFS JAMES
EMMI AND CATHERINE EMMI FOR:
(1) BREACH OF WRITTEN
CONTRACT;
(2) BREACH OF ORAL CONTRACT;
(3) BREACH OF THE IMPLIED
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND
FAIR DEALING;
(4) FRAUD & DECEIT– INTENTIONAL
MISREPRESENTATION;
(5) FRAUD & DECEIT– FALSE
PROMISE;
(6) UNJUST ENRICHMENT;
(7) UNLAWFUL AND UNFAIR
BUSINESS PRACTICES [Bus. & Prof.
Code § 17200];
(8) DECLARATORY RELIEF;
(9) NEGLIGENCE;
(10) INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS;
(11) VIOLATION OF PROBATE CODE
§859;
(12) VIOLATION OF CAL. WEL. & INST.
CODE §§151610.70; AND
(13) INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE
WITH CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS; AND
(14) VIOLATION OF CAL. FAMILY
CODE §1100
[DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL]-2-
COMPLAINT

NOW COME Plaintiffs, JAMES EMMI (“JAMES”), an individual, and CATHERINE EMMI
(“CATHERINE”) (collectively, the “Plaintiffs” or the “EMMIS”), an individual, who allege as
follows for their complaint against Defendant, CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY (“CHAPMAN”), a
California nonprofit corporation, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive:
1. Plaintiffs JAMES and CATHERINE EMMI reside in the City of Corona Del Mar,
County of Orange, State of California. Plaintiffs JAMES and CATHERINE have been parties to a
marital contract at all relevant times herein.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

2. At all relevant times herein, CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY was a nonprofit corporation
doing business in the State of California with its principal place of business located in the County of
Orange, State of California. CHAPMAN is a private university offering undergraduate and graduate
education for students.
3. At all relevant times herein, James Doti was, and is, the President of CHAPMAN.
4. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that at all times mentioned in
this Complaint, James Doti was authorized to make decisions and perform acts on behalf of
CHAPMAN as its President.
5. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that at all times mentioned in
this Complaint, James Doti was an agent of CHAPMAN as its President.
6. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that all times mentioned herein,
Defendant CHAPMAN, along with its agents and representatives, had knowledge of the marital
contract between JAMES and CATHERINE EMMI.
7. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate,
representative, partnership, or otherwise, of Defendants named herein as DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiff who therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names.
Plaintiffs will amend this complaint to show their true names and capacities when the same have
been ascertained.
8. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that each of the fictitiously
named DOE Defendants performed, participated in, and/or abetted the acts alleged herein, and is -3-
COMPLAINT

responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and that Plaintiffs’ damages herein
alleged were legally caused by those Defendants, among others.
9. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that at all times mentioned
herein, the Defendants, including DOES 1 through 100, and each of them, were agents, servants,
employees, or affiliates of other Defendants and in doing the things alleged herein were acting in the
course and scope of the authority of such agency, service, employment, affiliation, or with the
permission, knowledge, approval and consent of the other Defendants in that each and every act of
each said Defendant was ratified by the others. Plaintiff are informed and believe, and thereon
allege, that each of the DOE Defendants is responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein
alleged, and that Plaintiffs’ damages as herein alleged were legally caused by those Defendants,
among others.
10. Venue is proper in this Court because the Defendants has its principal place of
business and/or resides in the County of Orange. This case involves damages in excess of the
minimum jurisdiction of this court, and hence this is an unlimited jurisdiction case.
11. In and around 2008, CHAPMAN solicited individuals, companies and donors for
gifts and pledges to the “Science Building Campaign”. The campaign was launched to raise funds
for the construction of CHAPMAN’s new Center for Science and Technology.
COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
12. Plaintiff is informed and believes and herein alleges that in and around 2008,
CHAPMAN was also involved in raising funds for other science- related projects, including a health
sciences campus that it was planning to construct off-campus in Irvine, California.
13. At all times relevant herein, the EMMIS have been involved in donating monetary
gifts to educational institutions, like University of California, Irvine and Cal Tech, for scholarships
and facilities to further science education. As an engineer, Plaintiff JAMES EMMI, has had a
lifelong commitment to furthering science and technology in the engineering field because it was
this profession and skill set that made his own financial success possible.
14. On or about January 17, 2008, JAMES made a $50,000.00 cash gift to CHAPMAN
for the Science Building Campaign. -4-
COMPLAINT

15. Following JAMES’ $50,000 donation to the science campaign, Plaintiffs are
informed and believe and herein allege that CHAPMAN, through President James Doti (hereinafter,
“President Doti”), began inviting the EMMIS to concerts and events at CHAPMAN with the
intention of soliciting additional donations for the university and the science campaign. In addition,
Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that President Doti also invited the EMMIs to
numerous lunches and dinners with the same intention of soliciting further monetary gifts to the
university.
16. In July 2009, CHAPMAN’s Director of Principal Gifts sent Plaintiff JAMES a letter
notifying him that the CHAPMAN trustee real estate committee had “re-scaled the science complex
plans to a more reasonable $70 million project from the original projection of $120+ million.” In the
letter, CHAPMAN proposed a $500,000 estate pledge to JAMES, along with three possible types of
consideration JAMES could receive in return for his gift, i.e. the naming of a physical space,
permanent recognition of equipment at the building science building, or endowing a scholarship
program at CHAPMAN (“Pledge Proposal #1).
17. On or about April 6, 2012, JAMES entered a Bequest Agreement with CHAPMAN,
which provided that he would contribute an additional $450,000 to the already donated $50,000 cash
gift, to the Science Building Campaign. The total donation to the campaign per the Bequest
Agreement was $500,000.
18. JAMES met his obligations under the Bequest Agreement and contributed the
promised $500,000 to the Science Building Campaign.
19. Following that second substantial donation, in and around March 5, 2012,
CHAPMAN recruited JAMES to Chapman’s Schmid College of Science and Technology
Leadership Cabinet. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that CHAPMAN intentionally recruited
JAMES to join the leadership cabinet as a means of soliciting JAMES for more monetary
contributions, gifts, and pledges to CHAPMAN.
20. Nine months later, in and around November 2012, CHAPMAN notified the EMMIS
that the EMMIS were receiving the CHAPMAN Citizens of the Year Award. The award was
presented at CHAPMAN’s annual American Celebration event. That year, the EMMIS were -5-
COMPLAINT

featured on the cover of the event’s fliers and in numerous publications, including the Orange
County Register, several Chapman publications and the Daily Pilot, among other newspapers and
media outlets. Moreover, the EMMIS were honored on stage at the prestigious American
Celebration event, which was attended by hundreds of Orange County’s elite.
21. After four years of CHAPMAN’s constant solicitation efforts, which had garnered
them at least half a million dollars in gifts, CHAPMAN yet again approached the EMMIS with a
proposal to donate, at a minimum, $5 million to the Center for Science and Technology campaign.
22. In and around November 2012, CHAPMAN provided the EMMIS with a written
proposal requesting an investment of either $5 million or $10 million dollars, to be paid over a tenyear
period, to the School of Computational Sciences and Engineering (“Pledge Proposal #2”). This
proposal sought $4.5 million more than Pledge Proposal #1.
23. Pledge Proposal #2 offered naming recognition on either the entire School of
Computational Sciences and Engineering (in return for the $10 million investment), or on the Hall
of Technology (in return for the $5 million investment). In addition to naming privileges, the
proposal included a detailed description of the “full-scale media effort” that would result from such
donations, which would include announcements in publications such as the Orange County Register,
the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, Chronicle of Higher Education, Chronicle of
Philanthropy, The Orange County Business Journal, and Chapman University publications. Further,
the proposal promised the EMMI family would be recognized in extensive broadcast news media
coverage and press conferences, newspapers and periodicals, appropriate recognition at the new
science facility and at receptions, special evidence and dinners to honor the donors.
24. On November 27, 2012, JAMES sent CHAPMAN a letter rejecting
25. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that Defendant CHAPMAN had
knowledge of Plaintiff JAMES’s concerns regarding his future health and the impact of a $5 million
or $10 million commitment on his financial state in late 2012.
Pledge Proposal
#2, citing his age of 96, his questionable future health and the substantial financial considerations
the proposed pledge required (i.e. either $5 million or $10 million donation over ten years).
26. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that, in 2012, Defendant -6-
COMPLAINT

CHAPMAN knew that JAMES was concerned about a ten year commitment to donate either $5
million or $10 million dollars because his health was “questionable” and the financial consideration
was “quite heavy”.
27. Despite Plaintiff’s express rejection of Pledge Proposal #2, Defendant CHAPMAN
continued to hound the EMMIS for donations to their Center for Science and Technology campaign.
In early 2013, CHAPMAN’s President Doti continued to contact the EMMIS pressing for a massive
multi-million dollar donation to the School of Computational Sciences and Engineering, describing
the donation as an “investment”, a contract, and that the gift would result in naming recognition.
28. In and around 2013, CHAPMAN also sought gifts from CATHERINE EMMI as
well.
29. On April 18, 2013, CHAPMAN’s Vice President, Sheryl Bourgeois, sent
CATHERINE EMMI a letter confirming yet another contribution of $1000 to CHAPMAN’s
President’s Circle.
30. Following CATHERINE’s April donation, CHAPMAN wrote to the EMMIS seeking
donations in excess of $15,000 for the purchase of tables at the university’s American Celebration
event. Thereafter, the EMMIS generously contributed $100,000 to CHAPMAN’s 32nd
31. As if the $600,000+ the EMMIS donated to CHAPMAN was not enough,
CHAPMAN continued to prey on the EMMIS for millions of dollars despite JAMES’s emphatic
rejection of a donation beyond $500,000.
American
Celebration. These donations were platinum sponsorship level contributions, which purchased two
tables in the front row for the event.
32. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that between 2012 and 2013,
Plaintiff James was 97 years old and more susceptible to undue influence and persuasion.
33. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that CHAPMAN, in particular,
President Doti, had knowledge of JAMES’s confusion regarding the details of CHAPMAN’s pledge
proposals, including the amount of the pledge, the timeframe for payment, the financial impact such
a pledge would have on JAMES and CATHERINE, and the timeframe for the construction of the
project. -7-
COMPLAINT

34. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that CHAPMAN preyed on
Plaintiff JAMES for large donations, against his wishes, because they knew that JAMES was more
susceptible to inducement and confusion.
35. In and around 2013, CHAPMAN presented the EMMIS with a third proposal
requesting a financial investment of a whopping $12 million to be paid over a ten-year period, in
exchange for the same naming rights as those offered in Pledge Proposal #2– i.e. The James and
Catherine Emmi Hall of Technology and Engineering (“Pledge Proposal #3”). Pledge Proposal #3
also included the promise of a full-scale media effort to publicize the donation and included concept
art for the proposed Emmi Hall.
36. Defendant’s Pledge Proposal #3 offered the EMMIS the naming of the Hall of
Technology and Engineering in exchange for donating $12 million, rather than the naming of the
entire Center for Science and Technology – a recognition valued at $10 million in Pledge Proposal
#2. Likewise, Pledge Proposal #2 offered the EMMIS the naming of the Hall of Technology and
Engineering in exchange for a donation of only $5 million, rather than $12 million.
37. Plaintiffs did not accept Pledge Proposal #3.
38. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that Defendant CHAPMAN
valued the naming of the Hall of Technology and Engineering at $5 million, rather than $12 million.
In reality, the value was for far less than $5 million.
39. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that CHAPMAN’s Pledge
Proposal #3 offered a pledge contract with insufficient consideration because the naming of the Hall
was only valued by CHAPMAN at $5 million, rather than $12 million. In reality, the naming of the
Hall was worth far less.
40. Thereafter, CHAPMAN continued to push the EMMIS for the $12 million gift
stating the EMMIS “deserved to leave a legacy”. CHAPMAN’s tactics for persuading the EMMIS
included “wining and dining” them, inviting them to special events at CHAPMAN, sending them
personal cards and notes and even going as far as referring to the EMMIS as “family”. President
Doti intentionally showered the EMMIS with compliments and even went as far as requesting a
photograph of JAMES to place in his office because JAMES was “like a brother to him”. Defendant -8-
COMPLAINT

CHAPMAN’s conduct towards the EMMIS convinced the EMMIS that they could trust
CHAPMAN’s promises and representations.
41. Defendant CHAPMAN’s conduct towards the EMMIS also caused the EMMIS to
rely on the promises and representations of CHAPMAN as true and correct.
42. Defendant CHAPMAN’s aggressive pursuit of Plaintiffs finally wore down 98 year
old JAMES in September 2013.
43. In and around September 2013, less than a year after JAMES had rejected Pledge
Proposal #2, CHAPMAN’s President Doti visited the EMMIS at their home for tea to again plead
for a $12 million gift to CHAPMAN’s Center for Science and Technology. During that visit,
President Doti represented that: (1) the $12 million donation would be divided into four equal
payments due at the end of each year starting in 2013; (2) JAMES’s donated monies would be used
solely
44. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that Defendant CHAPMAN,
after noting signs of deterioration and vulnerability in JAMES, preyed on Plaintiff JAMES for a
multi-million donation.
for the construction of a single technology and engineering building, on the CHAPMAN
campus in Orange, California, to be named after the EMMIS; and (3) that JAMES’s building would
be constructed within that four year period ending in December 2016, to ensure the likelihood that
JAMES would live to see his legacy at the university.
45. At all times herein, Plaintiff JAMES expressed his intention that any money he
donated to CHAPMAN for the construction of the Emmi Hall for Technology and Engineering
would be made under the condition that his building would be constructed while he was alive.
46. Lured by CHAPMAN’s promises and representations and vulnerable to persuasion
and inducement because of his old age, JAMES, against his will, agreed to donate $12 million to
CHAPMAN. At no time, however, did CHAPMAN set forth that this donation would be
irrevocable. Similarly, at no time did Plaintiff JAMES agree to make this donation irrevocable.
47. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that on or about September 5,
2013, CHAPMAN prepared an Irrevocable Pledge Agreement to the Center for Science and
Technology (the “Irrevocable Pledge”) that was purportedly entered into between JAMES and -9-
COMPLAINT

CHAPMAN, committing JAMES to an irrevocable pledge of $12 million to be paid no later than
December 31, 2016.
48. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that Defendant CHAPMAN
valued the naming of the Hall of Technology and Engineering at $5 million, rather than $12 million.
Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that CHAPMAN’s Irrevocable Pledge lacked
consideration because it sought a donation of $12 million in exchange for the naming of a Hall that
was only valued by CHAPMAN at $5 million, and in reality was worth far less, rather than $12
million.
49. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that the money purportedly
pledged to CHAPMAN, by JAMES, was community property.
50. Plaintiffs have no recollection of ever signing the Irrevocable Pledge, either as a
donor or as a witness.
51. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that they were not given the
opportunity to have their attorneys review the Irrevocable Pledge.
52. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that Plaintiff JAMES did not
understand the terms of the Irrevocable Pledge at the time of the purported signing because of his
old age and confusion regarding the terms of the pledge he discussed with President Doti.
53. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that Defendant CHAPMAN did
not explain the terms of the Irrevocable Pledge fully or accurately to Plaintiff before JAMES
purportedly signed it. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that in fact, Defendant
CHAPMAN misrepresented the terms of the Irrevocable Pledge to JAMES.
54. Plaintiff CATHERINE did not read, accept or consent to the terms of the Irrevocable
Pledge.
55. Plaintiff CATHERINE did not accept or consent to the terms of any contract, either
written or oral, between Plaintiff JAMES and CHAPMAN for the donation of $12 million to the
university.
56. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that the Irrevocable Pledge is
not an enforceable contract because there was no meeting of the minds between Plaintiff JAMES -10-
COMPLAINT

and Defendant CHAPMAN.
57. Neither Plaintiff JAMES nor CATHERINE agreed to the terms of the Irrevocable
Pledge.
58. Plaintiff CATHERINE EMMI never consented to the transfer of any community
property funds to Defendant CHAPMAN through the Irrevocable Pledge or any other agreement or
contract between JAMES and Defendant.
59. Plaintiff JAMES did not intend to bind himself or his estate to a $12 million donation
to CHAPMAN without the possibility of being released from that commitment.
60. Plaintiff is informed and believes and herein alleges that Plaintiff JAMES would not
have agreed to donate more than two times the amount of Pledge Proposal #2, in exchange for
naming rights valued at $5 million, and no guarantee of a media effort, without consulting his
counsel first and without the consent of his wife, CATHERINE.
61. On or about September 20, 2013, JAMES authorized The Northern Trust Company
to transfer $1,875,579.06 in securities to CHAPMAN as a gift for the School of Computational
Sciences and Engineering without the written consent of CATHERINE.
62. Thereafter, on or about October 17, 2013, JAMES authorized Northern Trust
Company to transfer an additional $1,124,420.94 to CHAPMAN as a cash gift for the School of
Computational Sciences and Engineering without the written consent of CATHERINE.
63. As of October 2013, JAMES donated $3 million to the School of Computational
Sciences and Engineering, not including his previous hundreds of thousands of dollars of donations
for other CHAPMAN- related events and campaigns.
64. On October 30, 2013, CHAPMAN sent the EMMIS a letter confirming the transfer
of the EMMIS’ $3 million transfer from Northern Trust.
65. Despite the extraordinary gift of $12 million and the promise of a “full-scale media
effort” recognizing JAMES’s supreme generosity, CHAPMAN completely trivialized JAMES’s
significant donation in the face of the public. For example, CHAPMAN officials failed to recognize
JAMES either on stage or in the program at the 2013 American Celebration event. Instead,
CHAPMAN focused all of its energies on recognizing a $15 million donor to the CHAPMAN health -11-
COMPLAINT

sciences project. Further, the few instances in which CHAPMAN did recognize JAMES’s donation,
CHAPMAN failed to even acknowledge the correct amount of JAMES’s pledge. For instance, at the
“Christmas at the Ritz” event, CHAPMAN announced that JAMES had donated “in excess of $10
million”, rather than announcing the $12 million pledge. Moreover, the Orange County Register,
Daily Pilot and Chapman publications, all referenced JAMES’s gift as being “in excess of $10
million”, instead of the actual amount of the pledge. This complete failure to highlight JAMES’s
pledge minimizes the importance of the donation to the university, disregards CHAPMAN’s
obligations to conduct a full-scale media effort of JAMES’s contribution, and places into question
the actual amount of JAMES’s pledge.
66. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that CHAPMAN’s publication
of JAMES’s pledge as being “in excess of $10 million” acknowledges that JAMES’s commitment to
CHAPMAN was not irrevocably set at $12 million. Instead, JAMES’s pledge amount was subject to
change and release.
67. In early 2014, approximately one year after JAMES’s donation of the first $3 million
to CHAPMAN, JAMES asked President Doti about the status of construction on the Emmi Hall of
Technology and Engineering, for which his donations were contributed. In response, President Doti
vaguely responded that he had “other ideas”, that CHAPMAN had “made plans for a larger
building,” and that he had “other ideas…it’s a long story.” Thereafter, every time JAMES inquired
about the construction of Emmi Hall, he was met with excuses for why the building was not being
constructed.
68. At all time relevant herein, CHAPMAN represented that JAMES was the lead
investor and donor in the Center of Science and Technology project.
69. In May 2014, CHAPMAN surprised the EMMIS with yet another pledge proposal.
Pledge Proposal #4 sought to increase JAMES’s funding level to $20 million, in exchange for the
purported naming of the Center for Science and Technology and recognition of their gift as the lead
gift of the campaign, “undoubtedly garnering additional headlines and media attention.” Plaintiff
JAMES immediately rejected Pledge Proposal #4.
70. Prior to May 2014, CHAPMAN had already represented to JAMES that he was the -12-
COMPLAINT

lead investor in the Center for Science and Technology project.
71. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that Defendant CHAPMAN
misrepresented that JAMES was the top donor at CHAPMAN at all times relevant herein.
72. In May 2014, CHAPMAN provided JAMES with a Center for Science and
Technology Progress Report. The progress report estimated the cost of the construction for the
center at nearly $130 million and outlined that roughly $34 million had been pledged or contributed
to the project, leaving $100 million needed to fully fund the construction costs. Moreover, the report
provided that CHAPMAN was funding $80 million for the construction leaving $20 million needed
“for the project to commence”. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that prior to
May 2014, JAMES was told by CHAPMAN that the Emmi Hall of Technology and Engineering
would be completed by December 2016.
73. In September 2014, CHAPMAN sent another progress report, this time including
renderings of the proposed Center for Science and Technology project and a proposed budget and
timeline showing a longer design phase than originally anticipated on the project. This September
progress report showed continued delay in the construction of the Emmi Hall of Technology and
Engineering.
74. On September 26, 2014, CHAPMAN sent JAMES a letter notifying him that the Real
Estate Committee had approved the Center for Science and Technology building project and that the
next step in the process was to complete blue prints for the project.
75. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that the Center for Science and
Technology campaign began in at least 2012, when JAMES made his first $500,000 donation.
Thereafter, in 2013, JAMES agreed to donate $12 million to the campaign in reliance on the
promise that the construction of the Emmi Hall would be completed in four years. One year later,
however, in 2014, not even one blueprint had been prepared for the Emmi Hall.
76. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that CHAPMAN at all relevant
times herein never intended to construct and complete the Emmi Hall by December 2016 as
represented to JAMES EMMI in and around 2013.
77. To date, CHAPMAN has not provided a date for when construction will begin on the -13-
COMPLAINT
=
Center for Science and Technology, much less the Emmi Hall of Technology and Engineering.
78. CHAPMAN’s non-stop pressure to make sizeable donations to CHAPMAN,
CHAPMAN’s complete lack of progress in constructing Emmi Hall as promised, and the
abandonment of media coverage efforts by CHAPMAN recognizing JAMES’s massive $12 million
pledge, all breached the agreement between the EMMIS and CHAPMAN.
79. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that without any blue prints or
ground breaking on the Emmi Hall construction, it was not possible for CHAPMAN to comply with
its obligation and promise to JAMES that his building would be completed by December 2016.
80. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that on or about October 14,
2014, a CHAPMAN agent had a conversation with the EMMIS’ estate planning attorney, Michael
Lawler, regarding JAMES’s pledge. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that Mr.
Lawler, without the consent or instruction of JAMES, made representations to CHAPMAN that
JAMES was not withdrawing his pledge to the Center for Science and Technology, but instead was
seeking additional time to pay the remaining pledge amount of $9 million.
81. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that Michael Lawler
misrepresented to JAMES that he would act as his counsel to support his efforts to be released from
the $12 million pledge to CHAPMAN.
82. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that Michael Lawler, in and
around October 2014, knowingly misrepresented to CHAPMAN that JAMES: (1) intended to satisfy
his $12 million pledge to CHAPMAN; (2) was committed to the gift; and (3) that his sole concern
regarding the gift was the timing of the gift.
83. The EMMIS did not authorize Michael Lawler to make the aforementioned
representations to CHAPMAN.
84. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that the terms set forth in the
purported Irrevocable Pledge between JAMES and CHAPMAN are not a reflection of the terms
entered between the parties. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that CHAPMAN,
on numerous occasions, acknowledged the amount of the pledge by JAMES EMMI was not
irrevocably $12 million dollars, but rather it was an amount that could exceed $10 million. -14-
COMPLAINT
=
85. On or about October 15, 2014, JAMES wrote to CHAPMAN requesting a release
from the remaining $9 million left on his pledge. The letter expressed his disappointment with the
lack of progress on the Hall of Technology and Engineering, the delayed project completion date,
the increased projected cost of $130 million for the project, and the immense financial burden the
$12 million pledge was for him.
86. On November 4, 2014, Sheryl Bourgeois at CHAPMAN wrote JAMES
recommending an extended payment schedule for the remainder of the pledge amount, but still
pleading for accelerated payments.
87. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that unknown to them, on
November 5, 2014, Michael Lawler, without the EMMIS consent or authorization, wrote to
CHAPMAN thanking them for agreeing to modify JAMES’s $12 million pledge agreement so that
the $9 million balance due was “spread out over the next nine years.” In addition, the letter also
requested a modification of the payment plan on the pledge so that it would be paid at a rate of
$500,000 per year, with the unpaid balance to be paid when both the EMMIS passed away. The
EMMIS never authorized
88. On November 20, 2014, counsel for CHAPMAN sent the EMMIS a menacing letter
demanding immediate acceptance of CHAPMAN’s offer to extend the pledge payment schedule by
six years to 2022, and threatening litigation if JAMES failed to accept their offer. Further, the letter
also threatened CATHERINE directly, alleging she made derogatory and false statements about
CHAPMAN to third parties.
Michael Lawler to write this correspondence or to make such offers of
modification.
89. On or about December 9, 2014, CATHERINE retained her own counsel, Jean Gray
Platt, to respond to CHAPMAN’s November 20th
90. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and herein allege that CHAPMAN and DOE
Defendants conspired to harass, intimidate, pressure, defraud and harm the EMMIS, without the
letter. Attorney Platt demanded identification of
the purported “false and derogatory comments” made by CATHERINE and reiterated JAMES’s
request to be released from the $12 million pledge agreement. Both of these requests were flatly
denied by CHAPMAN’s counsel.-15-
COMPLAINT
consent, knowledge or authorization from the Plaintiffs.


Mary Cummins of Animal Advocates is a wildlife rehabilitator licensed by the California Department of Fish and Game. Mary Cummins is also a licensed real estate appraiser in Los Angeles, California.

Mary Cummins, Mary K. Cummins, Mary Katherine Cummins, Mary Cummins-Cobb, Mary, Cummins, Cobb, real estate, appraiser, appraisal, instructor, teacher, Los Angeles, Santa Monica, Beverly Hills, Pasadena, Brentwood, Bel Air, California, licensed, permitted, single family, condo, pud, hud, fannie mae, freddie mac, uspap, certified, residential, certified resident, apartment building, multi-family, commercial, industrial, expert witness, civil, criminal, orea, dre, insurance, bonded, experienced, bilingual, spanish, english, form, 1004, 2055, land, raw, acreage, vacant, insurance, cost, income approach, market analysis, comparative, theory, appraisal theory, cost approach, sales, matched pairs, plot, plat, map, diagram, photo, photographs, photography, rear, front, street, subject, comparable, sold, listed, active, pending, expired, cancelled, listing, mls, multiple listing service, claw, themls,

Wednesday, December 10, 2014

Judge Carol Boas Goodson, reviews, bias, negative, robingroom, judgepedia, evil

UPDATE: Carol Boas Goodson did not run for re-election in 2018. Los Angeles is free of this horrible Judge. Over the years I received many communications from many people who stated Judge Carol Boas Goodson did not rule according to the law or evidence. They also stated many times that she appears to hate Plaintiffs if not all parties in restraining order cases. Many people stated that they felt she was the most evil judge they'd ever encountered even the fake Judges on TV. Glad she is gone.

https://ballotpedia.org/Carol_Boas_Goodson

ORIGINAL: I am gathering information to make a report to the Judicial Commission about Judge Carol Boas Goodson.  In my opinion she has committed the following misconduct.

• Abuse of contempt/sanctions (She sanctioned an attorney $100 for requesting oral argument. Ordering me to pay legal fees of the other side when I should have received the restraining order is an illegal sanction.)
• Bias/appearance of bias toward a particular class (She made fun of an Indian person's accent in court in recorded minutes)
• Bias/appearance of bias not directed toward a particular class (She was certainly biased toward me in her behavior and ruling as per my motion to reconsider evidence and argument)
• Demeanor/decorum (She was extremely rude, cut me off, would not let me continue, said I was annoying before I even started speaking, she said my TRO application was annoying)
• Failure to ensure rights (She did not let me present my case, give oral argument, show evidence, show the video of me being hit. She did not let me record the audio of the hearing even though the law and court website said I am allowed. I did not receive a fair trial. She also did not rule according to the law,  evidence or even her past rulings. You do not have to show physical assault in order to get a restraining order. In my case there was a physical assault.)

I will be posting reviews, comments and reports made by others against Judge Carol Boas Goodson. I found these in books and on the Internet. I will post links to where I found them.

1. From Google book search: Book: Title "California Courts and Judges, Volume 1." Authors: Helen Y. Chang, Kathy Morris Wolf, Kenneth Jams Arnold. Publisher: James Publ. 1998, 1996. http://www.google.com/search?tbm=bks&hl=en&q=%22carol+boas+goodson%22

Pg 370. GOODSON, Carol. Boas. JUDGE SUPERIOR COURT, Los Angeles County. Appointment/Election: Appointed by Governor Brown Jr. Jan. 11, 1981 (date of oath Jan. 13, 1981), elected in 1982, and reelected in 1988, 1994, and 2000.

Education: J.D. (1970 magna cum laude). Western State Univ. College of Law. Fullerton. (member of school's first graduating class): B.A. (1968, cum laude, Anthropology), Univ. of Calif., Los Angeles (Westwood). (Completed last 2 years at UCLA concurrently with first 2 years at Western State Univ., graduating from both with honors): Attended: Hamilton High School, Los Angeles. Carol Boas Goodson Bar Review (Contracts; Torts; Criminal Law). Fullerton, Calif , and San Diego, Calif., ... Born: April 27, 1947; Los Angeles, Calif.; Married to Lawrence J. Berkowitz, Three children (Caroline, Lauren, Alexander by Jonathan Goodson). Interests: Enjoys children, art, and travel."

"But a lawyer who represents tenants said that in one trial, she treated his client so harshly that the client suffered a seizure right outside the courtroom, collapsed on the floor, and had to be carried out..." Lawyers who represent tenants in disputes with landlords said they think Judge Goodson is "nasty," "heavy-handed," "horrible," and ..."Her fiercest critic among interviewees said, "She doesn't belong [on the bench]. I think she belongs in a prison guarding violent prisoners. That fits her personality. She's...""She is that vicious. Two attorneys recounted instances in which Judge Goodson called them liars in open court even though they said she had no basis for making the accusation. Even defense attorneys, who are much more favorably disposed toward her, agreed that her temperament is "questionable," and "on the strong side," "stern," and "critical." Lawyers said she can be quick to impose stiff sanctions."

Here is a jpg of the snippet of the book. You have to search a few phrases to get the whole section.
Judge Carol Boas Goodson Los Angeles Superior Court photo
A Judge needs to have been admitted to the bar for at least ten years before they can apply to be a Judge, "An official of the judicial branch of government with authority to decide lawsuits and preside over trials brought before the court. The term “judge” may also refer to all judicial officers, including Supreme Court justices. An applicant for appointment as a judge must have been admitted to practice law in California for at least 10 years."

Judge Carol Boas Goodson was admitted to the bar June 1971. She became Judge January 1981. It wasn't quite ten years. I also can't find any legal experience as a lawyer. Why did she instantly become a judge instead of practice as a lawyer? Perhaps she would have learned how to be a fair judge if she practiced law before becoming a judge. I also wonder if she legally was allowed to join the bar when her law school was not accredited. Here are current requirements to apply to the bar. Back then it was probably more difficult. http://admissions.calbar.ca.gov/Requirements.aspx

I would like to note that her father Maxwell S. Boas founded the law school and was the dean. The school was not accredited until partially in 1998 and maybe fully in 2005. How real is her law school degree if she was the first graduating class of a school founded by her father that was not accredited? That means she could only take the bar in CA and most law firms would not hire her. Why would she go to a new law school that is not accredited? Why not go to UCLA? This school also has a bad history with students dropping out, few passing the bar and many not being able to find jobs. Google the school and you'll see the reviews. You can pull up a 1977 article where Maxwell Boas states they don't care about grades, degrees or transcripts when they accept students. He said they want to make "nuts and bolts attorneys, not supreme court judges." You got that right. He said most applicants were rejected from other schools, are 28 years old and have only gone to two years of college. Did he create this law school for his daughter Carol? And also to make money from people who weren't qualified to go to law school, may not pass the bar and might not get a job? Is this like the Barbizon School of Modeling scam? "Everyone can be a model if you just give us money to take classes on posture!"

And it's in Fullerton in Orange County and San Diego. How did she go to UCLA in Westwood and this school in Orange County, San Diego at the same time? Twice as much schooling with a huge commute? They lived in Cheviot Hills at the time. San Diego is 120 miles south. Orange County is 30 miles south.

I tried to verify her education through year books and school records. She went to Palms Junior High in Los Angeles class B-9 of 1962. Here is her public class photo from a public source. Pretty on the outside.

Carol Boas (Goodson) Palms Junior High School, Los Angeles, California 1962
Alexander Hamilton High School was a senior high school at the time. I see no records for her but that doesn't mean she didn't attend. I also don't see any records of her in the UCLA Yearbooks. I just searched the name and checked the rear index of students for all years she should have been there. Her name is not in any of the yearbooks. This means she wasn't involved in any social activities, sports, clubs or sorority. It also means she didn't take the free graduation photo shoot and did not show up for graduation. Maybe she lacked proper early socialization. That is I'm sure one big reason why ***has been stalking, harassing, threatening, defaming, libeling me and sending guys to hit me. *** dropped out of the eighth grade and never leaves her cave. Even her board of director told me she lacks basic social skills which is why they generally do the training and speaking.

2. "Now if you get a limited civil case downtown, your choices are so limited. If you ding Carol Boas Goodson, the most evil, biased judge I've ever seen, you may get this ding bat."
http://www.underdoglaw.com/showthread.php?183-Judge-Ray-L.-Hart-Dept.-10-Stanley-Mosk-Courthouse

3. "This woman is rich bitch incarnate. All she cares about is her daughter and horses. Her husband is Mark Goodson of tv fame. She is pro large corporate parties and very anti-underdog. She will try to set you up and play games. She is lazy and should not have anything to do with the law.

Given the above, she has a single redeeming quality, while her nebeshy law clerk works up all motions and seems to make all decisions in the cases, she will fax tentatives several days before the hearing and you can submit without appearing. The problem is if you do not submit, once you appear at court you will NOT even speak to the Judge. She will not entertain oral argument unless you push hard or cite a statute requiring oral argument on that particular type of hearing. You will be forced to tell your argument to the law clerk (I think his name is John) who goes back into Chambers to see the Wizard (Judge). The law clerk comes out again and says sorry, tentative stands. I think I saw her sanction an attorney $100 who insisted on oral argument before the Judge. File your 170.6 as to this woman."
http://www.underdoglaw.com/showthread.php?21-Carol-B.-Goodson-LASC-Dept.-75

I'd first like to note that this is 2004. I noticed that she used to handle civil matters. Now she only handles restraining orders. I have a feeling that's like being in waste management or animal control in the City, i.e. the lowest Judge position except for maybe traffic. That may be why she's so mean but the book written in 1998 shows she was just as mean back then when she handled limited civil cases. Of course now that there are no court reporters she is free to say and do anything she likes. She lied in my court order and said I gave oral argument. I was not allowed to give oral argument. I was only permitted to ask one question which she didn't even answer honestly.

Judge Carol Boas Goodson is rich and some have used the other word as well. Here is her list of investments in her 2011 financial disclosure. http://www.fppc.ca.gov/form700/2011/Judges/County/A-M/R_Goodson_Carol_B.pdf 
Notice she owns shares of some truly evil companies, i.e. Monsanto, Phillip Morris, Coca Cola... She also owns bonds for the La Canada school system where attorney Dean Rocco's children go to school. It probably also doesn't help that he looks exactly like her nephews one of which is a lawyer. Dean Rocco also used to be an intern at LA Superior Court for another judge.

The addresses of her daughters homes are on the bottom, so is her current home address at 541 S. Rossmore, 90020 because she has a financial interest in the properties. Her father Maxwell S. Boas was a wealthy lawyer and then she married Jonathan Goodson the son of Mark Goodson who made money in the TV game show business. They divorced many years ago. In fact Judge Carol Boas Goodson has sued her husband a few times. She filed for divorce in 1984. Jonathan has a new wife Nancy and daughter who are the ones into horses. Judge Carol Boas Goodson is currently married to attorney Lawrence J Berkowitz. Just wanted to get the little facts straight. I grew up in Beverly Hills so I've run into the family before. Her daughter is Caroline Boas Goodson also an attorney. Judge Carol Boas Goodson was born April 27, 1947. Her daughter was born October 3, 1977 so you can tell them apart. This is all public information found on the Internet.

4. Minutes from the proceedings included in the appeal of R B v. William Mears B222991. FTR I am not friends with R B. I don't even know her. I found her case researching for my appeal. Everything I used is only found in the public record of her appeal. She and I have nothing to do with each other.
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1575708.html 

Judge Carol Boas Goodson made fun of the woman's accent. That is racial discrimination, bias toward a particular class, improper court room demeanor/decourum, failure to ensure rights. R B won the appeal. Three appeals court judges agreed that Judge Carol Boas Goodson did not rule according to the evidence, failed to ensure her rights. They reversed the order. I mentioned this case specifically in  my hearing and the Judge said "I don't remember it." I then stated that three appeals court Judges unanimously reversed her order and the case is identical to mine. Then Judge Carol Boas Goodson said "it was an  unpublished opinion. It's uncitable." Who cares. Three appeals court judges reversed her order. And that is not the only orders that have been reversed. There are many. I may post a few of the  more outrageous ones later.

Go to the link and read the minutes included in the public opinion. Here is a summary of the appeal.

"Plaintiff and appellant Radha Bharadwaj appeals from a judgment of the superior court denying her petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 1 for an injunction preventing harassment against her by respondent William Mears.   She further appeals the grant of attorney fees to Mears.   Bharadwaj contends that during the hearing conducted on her section 527.6 petition, the trial judge exhibited bias against her, in part based on her ethnicity, in violation of her constitutional due process right to a fair hearing.   Bharadwaj further argues that the trial judge engaged in acts of judicial misconduct and committed errors of law that deprived her of a fair trial.   We do not reach the question whether Bharadwaj's constitutional due process rights were violated because we conclude that a new trial is warranted under section 657 due to irregularities in the section 527.6 hearing and the court's erroneous exclusion of evidence.   Because we vacate the judgment, the attorney fees award in favor of Mears is necessarily vacated as well.   We further exercise our discretion to remand the matter for a hearing in front of a new judge.

Bharadwaj filed a “motion for a new trial and/or in the alternative for reconsideration” alleging that she “was not given a fair opportunity to present her case,” and that she and her counsel “had to fight through a one-sided onslaught of hostility, impenetrable skepticism, sarcasm, mockery, insult and interruption from the court.”

Bharadwaj also contended that on at least three occasions during the hearing, the court “attempted to mimic in a mocking fashion the ethnic accent of [Bharadwaj], a foreign-born naturalized U.S. citizen.”

Only a few minutes into the trial, Bharadwaj's counsel objected, “Your Honor, I declare a mistrial.   You are not letting me continue.   I want this on the record.   I ask for a mistrial.   You know, you have interrupted me at every single stage.”   A few minutes later, Bharadwaj's counsel again protested:  “Your Honor, I haven't had a chance to finish.   Every time I say something, you have cut me off.   I would like to try my own case.”

I'll add more reviews later. I am truly shocked after this appeal that Judge Carol Boas Goodson is still on the bench. I did notice that no one has run against her in a long time. While she is paid $179,000 a year being a Judge for restraining orders probably is the lowest gig in the court house. I bet she was demoted because of her extremely bad behavior. Maybe they hope she'll quit. I bet she originally aspired to be a Federal District Court Judge or maybe an Appeals or Supreme Court Judge. She's just a judge handling restraining orders. Her rulings have nothing to do with the law or evidence. She favors city, county entities.

Mary Cummins of Animal Advocates is a wildlife rehabilitator licensed by the California Department of Fish and Game. Mary Cummins is also a licensed real estate appraiser in Los Angeles, California.

Mary Cummins, Mary K. Cummins, Mary Katherine Cummins, Mary Cummins-Cobb, Mary, Cummins, Cobb, real estate, appraiser, appraisal, instructor, teacher, Los Angeles, Santa Monica, Beverly Hills, Pasadena, Brentwood, Bel Air, California, licensed, permitted, single family, condo, pud, hud, fannie mae, freddie mac, uspap, certified, residential, certified resident, apartment building, multi-family, commercial, industrial, expert witness, civil, criminal, orea, dre, insurance, bonded, experienced, bilingual, spanish, english, form, 1004, 2055, land, raw, acreage, vacant, insurance, cost, income approach, market analysis, comparative, theory, appraisal theory, cost approach, sales, matched pairs, plot, plat, map, diagram, photo, photographs, photography, rear, front, street, subject, comparable, sold, listed, active, pending, expired, cancelled, listing, mls, multiple listing service, claw, themls,

Judge Carol Boas Goodson, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge, reviews, appeals, reversed decisions

Judge Carol Boas Goodson. I've been doing research for my motion to reconsider restraining order and have uncovered some mind boggling things about Judge Carol Boas Goodson. She treated another woman trying to get a restraining order the same way she treated me. I was under the assumption that Judge Carol Boas Goodson just had a bad day. Based on this appeal and other reviews of Judge Carol Boas Goodson, she has a very poor history when it comes to treating people fairly, allowing people to present evidence and ruling according to the law and evidence. I can't believe this Judge has been able to get away treating people like this for all these years.

 
Anyway below is the opinion in the case R B v Mears. I found it on FindLaw case law. There are minutes from courtroom testimony which show just how incredibly rude and out right mean Judge Carol Boas Goodson is to people. I really find this behavior shocking. I know I have never been treated so rudely and poorly by a judge in my life. I am always polite and professional with judges. Judge Carol Boas Goodson needs to retire.
 
Below is from the original court ruling by Judge Carol Boas Goodson.
Hrng on Pet n Prohibit Harassm ent - TRO is denied.


0 2 / 2 5 / 2 0 1 0 at 08: 30 am in Departm ent 75, Carol Boas Goodson, Presiding
MOTI ON - ATTORNEY FEES - Grant ed
0 2 / 1 0 / 2 0 1 0 at 08: 30 am in Departm ent 75, Carol Boas Goodson, Presiding
Court Order - Com plet ed
0 1 / 2 2 / 2 0 1 0 at 08: 30 am in Departm ent 75, Carol Boas Goodson, Presiding
Below is the amicus brief. 

RADHA BHARADWAJ v. WILLIAM MEARS

 
 
RADHA BHARADWAJ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WILLIAM MEARS, Defendant and Respondent.
 
 
B222991
-- July 27, 2011

Filed opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
introduction
Plaintiff and appellant Radha Bharadwaj appeals from a judgment of the superior court denying her petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 1 for an injunction preventing harassment against her by respondent William Mears.   She further appeals the grant of attorney fees to Mears.   Bharadwaj contends that during the hearing conducted on her section 527.6 petition, the trial judge exhibited bias against her, in part based on her ethnicity, in violation of her constitutional due process right to a fair hearing.   Bharadwaj further argues that the trial judge engaged in acts of judicial misconduct and committed errors of law that deprived her of a fair trial.   We do not reach the question whether Bharadwaj's constitutional due process rights were violated because we conclude that a new trial is warranted under section 657 due to irregularities in the section 527.6 hearing and the court's erroneous exclusion of evidence.   Because we vacate the judgment, the attorney fees award in favor of Mears is necessarily vacated as well.   We further exercise our discretion to remand the matter for a hearing in front of a new judge.
factual and procedural background
Bharadwaj and Mears are next-door neighbors in a condominium project with two detached units;  Bharadwaj and her husband live in the rear unit, and Mears lives with his girlfriend Odette Leonelli in the front unit.   Bharadwaj and Leonelli were once friends, but beginning in 2003 their relationship deteriorated over a number of property disputes, such as Leonelli's barking dog, overgrowth of foliage from Leonelli's property onto Bharadwaj's property, parking issues, and driveway access.   Mears apparently entered the picture in 2007.
In March 2009, Bharadwaj sought and was granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Mears based on an affidavit she submitted documenting a number of alleged incidents of harassment beginning in 2007.   As required by section 527.6, a hearing was set for several weeks after the date the TRO was issued, the purpose of which was to determine whether a permanent injunction should be issued.   At the outset of the hearing on April 10, 2009, the trial court initially assigned to the case suggested that the parties engage in mediation of their dispute.   The parties agreed to a continuance of the hearing to July 23, 2009, while they engaged in mediation.   The parties stipulated to a stay in enforcement of the TRO conditioned on all parties adhering to the terms of the TRO “in a reciprocal manner,” even though the TRO was directed only at Mears.2  The parties subsequently stipulated to several further continuances of the hearing, with the terms of the TRO as ordered by the court on April 10, 2009 remaining in full force and effect, pending the evidentiary hearing.
The section 527.6 hearing ultimately took place on January 22, 2010, before a different judge.   Bharadwaj's counsel called two witnesses – Mears and Bharadwaj – and attempted to call five other witnesses but the court excluded the witnesses' testimony on the grounds that it was either speculative, repetitive, or irrelevant.   The court further ruled that incidents prior to 2009 were irrelevant for purposes of determining whether a permanent injunction should issue.   The court denied the petition for an injunction.
Bharadwaj filed a “motion for a new trial and/or in the alternative for reconsideration” alleging that she “was not given a fair opportunity to present her case,” and that she and her counsel “had to fight through a one-sided onslaught of hostility, impenetrable skepticism, sarcasm, mockery, insult and interruption from the court.”   Bharadwaj accused the court of prejudging her case, and of unfairly preventing her from calling additional witnesses, introducing rebuttal evidence, and properly examining and cross-examining witnesses.   Bharadwaj also contended that on at least three occasions during the hearing, the court “attempted to mimic in a mocking fashion the ethnic accent of [Bharadwaj], a foreign-born naturalized U.S. citizen.”   Bharadwaj further alleged that the court committed legal error in requiring proof of actual physical violence or explicit death threats as a condition of granting the injunction, and in excluding evidence of incidents prior to 2009 that were necessary to establish a pattern of harassment by Mears.   Bharadwaj did not request that the judge recuse herself, or request that the matter be assigned to a different judge for a new trial.
Construing Bharadwaj's motion as a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the section 527.6 hearing “was not a trial,” the court denied it, finding that it was procedurally deficient, and in any event, “has not stated any new facts, circumstances or law.”   The court granted Mears' motion for attorney fees in the amount of $22,700.
It appears that the court never entered judgment in favor of Mears.   Bharadwaj filed a notice of appeal from three unsigned minute orders denying the petition for an injunction, notifying counsel that the motion for a new trial would be treated as a motion for reconsideration, and denying Bharadwaj's motion for reconsideration and granting Mears'attorney fees motion.   Unsigned minute orders are not appealable orders.  (Palazzi v. Air Cargo Terminals, Inc. (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 190, 192;  § 581d.)   However, in the interests of justice and to avoid delay, we deem the minute order denying the petition for an injunction prohibiting harassment to incorporate a judgment of dismissal and will treat the notice of appeal as applying to that judgment.  (Nystrom v. First Nat. Bank of Fresno (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 759, 762–763.)
discussion
I. Claim of Bias In Violation of Constitutional Due Process
On appeal, Bharadwaj argues that her federal constitutional rights to due process were violated because the trial judge was biased against her based on her ethnicity, as evidenced by the judge's “derisive mocking” of her accent on several occasions when repeating the phrase “focused malevolence” that Bharadwaj used to describe the manner in which Mears allegedly glared at her.   Bharadwaj also suggests that other conduct by the court during the section 527.6 hearing – including showing hostility towards her counsel and improperly interfering with her counsel's questioning of witnesses, and argumentative questioning of Bharadwaj and ridiculing of her testimony –demonstrated that the judge was biased against her, in violation of her constitutional rights to due process.
“ ‘A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’   [Citation.]”  (People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1000 (Freeman ).)   The federal due process clause requires reversal based on judicial bias where there exists “ ‘ “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker [that] is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” ’ ”  (Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 996, quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (2009) 556 U.S. _, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2257.) 3  It is only “the exceptional case presenting extreme facts where a due process violation will be found.”  (Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1005.)
It is not necessary for us to decide whether Bharadwaj's constitutional due process rights were violated as a result of the trial judge's alleged bias against her.  “It is a well-settled rule that if statutory relief is adequate, it is unnecessary and inappropriate for a court to reach constitutional issues.”  (Americans for Safe Access v. County of Alameda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1295;  see Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 1, 17, fn.   13 [“As a prudential matter, we routinely decline to address constitutional questions when it is unnecessary to reach them.”].) Such judicial restraint is warranted here, because, as further discussed below, we have concluded that a new trial is mandated under section 657 and that a new judge should preside over the retrial.
II. Errors Alleged to Justify a New Trial Under Section 657
We now address the alleged “irregularities” in the proceedings and errors of law committed by the court, of which Bharadwaj complained in her motion for a new trial pursuant to section 657.  (Estate of Friedman (1918) 178 Cal. 27, 39 [“On a motion for a new trial, upon the ground of irregularities in the proceedings of the court, we are dealing with those irregularities, and it is immaterial whether they result from bias and prejudice or not.”];  Develop–Amatic Engineering v. Republic Mortgage Co. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 143, 150.)
A. Court's Error in Refusing to Consider Motion for a New Trial
After Bharadwaj filed a “motion for a new trial and/or in the alternative for reconsideration,” the court issued a minute order stating that “the court will be treating [the] motion as a motion for reconsideration as the hearing on 1/22/10 was not a trial.”   Later, the court considered the motion only as a motion for reconsideration and then denied it, finding that the motion was defective in failing to comply with the specific requirements for a motion for reconsideration, and further did not state any new facts, circumstances, or law.
Bharadwaj contends, and Mears concedes, that the trial court erred in refusing to consider her motion a motion for a new trial based on the rationale that the evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 527.6 was not a trial.   We agree that the trial court wrongly concluded that a motion for a new trial may not be taken from a section 527.6 hearing.  Section 527.6 sets forth a procedure “for what is in effect a highly expedited lawsuit on the issue of harassment” (Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners' Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 732 (Schraer )), and “[t]he role of the court in a section 527.6 hearing does not differ from its role in other trial settings where the court is the trier of fact.”  (Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1110.)   Accordingly, a party to a section 527.6 hearing may move for a new trial, and the court should have construed Bharadwaj's motion as such.
We now turn to the question whether the motion for a new trial should have been granted, examining the entire record and making an independent assessment of whether there were grounds for granting the motion.  (ABF Capital Corp. v. Berglass (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 825, 832.)   Bharadwaj argued that a new trial was warranted due to “[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court ․ by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.” (§ 657, subd. (1).)  Bharadwaj alleged numerous acts of judicial misconduct that prevented Bharadwaj from fairly presenting her case, including the court's prejudging of the case;  its “assumption of the role of de facto counsel for [Mears],” including by aggressively cross-examining Bharadwaj and repeatedly expressing skepticism of her testimony;  its constant interruptions of counsel preventing him from eliciting testimony from Bharadwaj and from effectively cross-examining Mears;  and the refusal to allow Bharadwaj to call several witnesses.   Bharadwaj further argued that a new trial should be granted based on the trial court's “error in law” in improperly excluding evidence of events prior to 2009 to show a “course of conduct” justifying a permanent injunction under section 527.6. (§ 657, subd. (7);  § 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
B. Irregularities in the Section 527.6 Proceeding
The purpose of a section 527.6 hearing is to determine whether the plaintiff can prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she is the victim of harassment justifying a permanent injunction against the harasser. (§ 527.6, subd. (d).)  Section 527.6 defines harassment as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.   The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b).)  A “course of conduct” is further defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
From our review of the transcript of the section 527.6 hearing, we conclude that there were indeed “irregularities” in the manner in which the court conducted the proceeding that interfered with Bharadwaj's right to a fair hearing on the question whether Mears engaged in a willful and harassing course of conduct that reasonably caused her emotional distress.
At the outset, we recognize the significant leeway that courts have to control the conduct of a trial.  (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1108.)   In particular, we note that section 527.6 expressly authorizes courts to make an “independent inquiry” during a hearing to determine whether an injunction prohibiting harassment should be issued. (§ 527.6. subd. (d).)  Further, “[m]ere expressions of opinion by a trial judge based on actual observation of the witnesses and evidence in the courtroom” should not be the basis for reversing a judgment.  (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1111.)   However, in this hearing, the court exceeded the bounds of reasonable conduct for a judge seeking to exercise control of the proceedings and reach a fair and efficient result.
First, the record strongly suggests that the trial judge prejudged the case.   (McVey v. McVey (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 120, 123 [“A trial judge should not prejudge the issues but should keep an open mind until all of the evidence is presented to him.”].) In Murr v. Murr, a non-jury divorce proceeding, the judge was found to have committed judicial misconduct in prejudging the case.   (Murr v. Murr (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 511, 521 (Murr ).)   Soon after the trial started, the judge stated:  “How much more time are we going to waste on this?” and “You both know what is going to happen, so let us get through as quickly as possible.”  (Murr, supra, 87 Cal.App.2d at p. 517.)   He proceeded to make numerous comments to the plaintiff's attorney about his wasting the court's time, including:  “Well, it seems to me you must be getting paid by the hour, and want to waste as much of the Court's time as possible”;  “I suggest that if you have any evidence to prove your complaint that you put it on, and not waste so much time”;  “Have you any evidence in support of your complaint?”;   and “[C]annot you try the case without wasting so much time?   This case should have been tried in 10 or 20 minutes, just like an ordinary divorce case.”  (Id. at p. 517.)
The trial judge here seemed similarly predisposed to rule against Bharadwaj based on a preconceived notion that the case involved run-of-the-mill property disputes between neighbors, as opposed to harassment that deserved to be enjoined.   At the very outset of the hearing, when counsel for Mears advised the court that he had witnesses who would not arrive until the afternoon, the court responded, “I have a feeling we'll finish by morning.”   Before any witness took the stand, the court questioned Bharadwaj's counsel narrowly about some of the incidents that took place, and immediately characterized them as “very small.”
When Bharadwaj's counsel attempted to examine his first witness, Mears, the court interrupted him before he could even finish his first question:
“Mr. Cohen:  Okay. Mr. Mears, I just wanted to –
“The Court:  I want to hear about the road rage.   I don't want to hear about the fact that the neighbors don't like each other.   So many of my cases are cases where people don't like each other.   I want to know how a quasi-criminal event should evolve out of the two neighbors who don't like each other.   I want to hear why your client is legitimately in fear of her life.   Just being harassed is not grounds –
“(Court and counsel are talking over one another.)
“Mr. Cohen:  Okay. It is not how I planned to start.
“The Court:  Well, you know, I think that is where this case is getting off record.   There has been a lot of attorney fees being generated for issues I don't like.   What is the property line?   Who owns what?  ․ Where is the parking?”
The record suggests the trial judge had already made up her mind before the testimony even began that the case was a waste of time.   The court interrupted Bharadwaj's counsel repeatedly during his attempted examination of Mears, making statements such as:  “You have wasted this court's time so far for 20 minutes, and I haven't heard one piece of evidence”;  “I think the record is pretty clear that you have proven nothing.   You haven't proved anything yet”;  and “I think the record reflects you are going for more than an hour and you haven't elicited any information that would support your case.”   As in Murr, the court's many “ill-advised and unnecessary comments with respect to wasting [her] time establish definitely that [she] did not consider that the issues presented by plaintiff were worthy of consideration.”  (Murr, supra, 87 Cal.App.2d at p. 520.)
When Bharadwaj took the stand to submit to direct examination, the court essentially took over the examination, questioning her in a one-sided manner and characterizing her testimony to fit the court's view that Bharadwaj's request for an injunction was motivated solely by minor property disputes, rather than a fear of continued harassment.   We acknowledge that “ ‘ “if a judge desires to be further informed on certain points mentioned in the testimony it is entirely proper for him to ask proper questions for the purpose of developing all the facts in regard to them.   Considerable latitude is allowed the judge in this respect as long as a fair trial is indicated [to both parties].” ’ ”  (Conservatorship of Pamela J. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 807, 827.)   Moreover, in a nonjury trial a judge may have greater leeway to examine witnesses than in a jury trial, and particularly so here, given the court's authority under section 527.6 to “make an independent inquiry.” (§ 527.6, subd. (d).)  But the inquiry must be reasonable and respectful.   Here, the record reflects that the court repeatedly cut off Bharadwaj, belittled her, and mischaracterized her testimony while questioning her in a way that was not consistent with permitting her to present her case.
After permitting Bharadwaj's counsel to ask only three questions of Bharadwaj, the court assumed the role of a cross-examiner focused on getting Bharadwaj to admit that Mears had never physically harmed or explicitly threatened to harm her, which the trial court seemed to view as a prerequisite for issuing the injunction.   In response to the court's questions, Bharadwaj attempted to testify about an incident that culminated in what she considered “road rage” against her by Mears.   She testified that the incident began when she pulled out of her driveway and saw Mears standing on the nearby sidewalk, glaring at her.   When the court asked her what she meant, Bharadwaj stated that he was “looking with focused, monovalent eyes on me.”  (Obviously, the court reporter transcribed the word “monovalent” a term that makes no sense in this context, in lieu of “malevolent,” and did so throughout the hearing.)   The court then stated, “He looked at you in a mean way.”   Bharadwaj attempted to explain that “it goes beyond that,” but the court did not permit her to elaborate, and instead asked Bharadwaj, “Has he ever physically harmed you?   Yes or no.”   Bharadwaj then testified that Mears' car soon caught up to her several blocks away, and Mears gunned his engine, sped into the wrong lane, and intentionally cut her off, coming within a foot of her car and causing her to panic.   The court was dismissive of this testimony, following it up with the question, “Now, but the entire time you have known him ․ there has never been any physical contact between you?”
Bharadwaj attempted to testify about another incident with Mears that grew out of a disagreement over driveway access and allegedly escalated to the point that Mears was swearing and yelling at her and attempted to enter her garage.   However, the court repeatedly interrupted her before she could finish explaining what had happened, mischaracterizing her testimony as establishing only that “there was an argument over access to a parking area that you initiated verbal contact with the respondent and he responded by saying, ‘I can't hear you,’ which you interpreted as being monovalent focus.”   When Bharadwaj attempted to explain that there was more to the incident than that, because Mears continued to swear and yell at her and tried to come into her garage, the judge commented, “Again over the parking?” and made it clear she wanted to move on to another topic.   Bharadwaj managed to come back to the event to add that ten minutes after she shut the garage door before Mears could enter, she went outside to take out the trash, and found Mears still there, yelling.   The court responded, “Yelling that he owned the property and he has a right to the parking?”
When Bharadwaj's counsel attempted to interject a question and asked Bharadwaj why she was afraid of Mears, the court immediately interrupted before Bharadwaj could answer, stating, “He has never touched you.   He has never sworn at you.   He has never threatened you and the most he has done is give you a monovalent look and the finger when you were arguing about the parking situation.”   Despite counsel's objection to this mischaracterization of Bharadwaj's testimony, the court continued:  “The point is, ma‘am, your argument really relates to neighborhood issues and particularly parking, and blocking the driveway.”   Repeatedly, the court cut off counsel's attempt to elicit testimony on other incidents and the reasons Bharadwaj was afraid of Mears, inserting comments such as, “The one incident that was described is absolutely meaningless.   We know that the argument is over parking spaces in the neighborhood dispute and monovalent looks for her psychological fear.”   The court added:  “You are neighbors, ma‘am.   If I gave you a TRO, I can only shudder at the thought how you would be calling the police to have him arrested every time you interpret a look from him as monovalent focus.”   Looking at the examination of Bharadwaj as a whole, we conclude that she was not given a fair opportunity to present her case for an injunction preventing harassment.
Relying on the principle that “a judge's examination of a witness may not be assigned as error on appeal where no objection was made when the questioning occurred” (People v. Corrigan (1957) 48 Cal.2d 551, 556), Mears contends that Bharadwaj failed to object when the court took over the questioning and thus has forfeited the claimed error.   We do not find such a forfeiture here.   Only a few minutes into the trial, Bharadwaj's counsel objected, “Your Honor, I declare a mistrial.   You are not letting me continue.   I want this on the record.   I ask for a mistrial.   You know, you have interrupted me at every single stage.”   A few minutes later, Bharadwaj's counsel again protested:  “Your Honor, I haven't had a chance to finish.   Every time I say something, you have cut me off.   I would like to try my own case.”   In addition, counsel frequently objected to the court's mischaracterizations of Bharadwaj's testimony.   Given the tenor of these proceedings, inserting objections each time the court interrupted and took over the questioning would have been futile.  (People v. Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1237;  Haluck v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 994, 1007.)
The trial court's repeated criticisms of Bharadwaj's counsel further prevented counsel from properly putting on Bharadwaj's case.  (See Murr, supra, 87 Cal.App.2d at pp. 517–521.)   To be sure, counsel's questions were sometimes rather far afield, and thus it was not unreasonable for the court to steer counsel back to the conduct constituting a pattern of harassment.  (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1111 [“When an attorney engages in improper behavior, such as ignoring the court's instructions or asking inappropriate questions, it is within a trial court's discretion to reprimand the attorney, even harshly, as the circumstances require.”].) However, the court was gratuitously harsh, making statements such as, “Counsel, I am really surprised at the job you are doing”;  “I am kind of shocked [at your questioning] to tell you the truth”;  “You have to be kidding me, counsel”;  and “You certainly did a good job of making [Mears'] case so that his attorney really doesn't have to get him on direct.”   As the proceedings continued to deteriorate, the court told counsel, “You can't put words in [Bharadwaj's] mouth.   You have done a good job of that.”   Bharadwaj's counsel responded, “Is there anything at all good you can say about me?”   The court replied, “No,” at which point counsel renewed his request for a mistrial.   The court's treatment of counsel throughout the hearing was “the antithesis of judicial decorum and courtesy.”   (Haluck v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003.)
The trial judge's prejudgment of the case, her improper questioning and mischaracterizing of Bharadwaj's testimony, and her pattern of hostility towards Bharadwaj's counsel constituted judicial misconduct and “irregularities” in the proceedings.4
Error in Law
Bharadwaj also contends that a new trial must be granted because the court committed an “error in law” in improperly excluding evidence of harassing incidents prior to 2009. (§ 657, subd. (7).) 5  We review the trial court's exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion.  (Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1431.)
Section 527.6 directs the court to “receive any testimony that is relevant” at the hearing on a petition for a permanent injunction against harassment. (§ 527.6, subd. (d).)  As discussed above, under section 527.6, harassment may consist of “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose,” and that reasonably causes the plaintiff to suffer substantial emotional distress. (§ 527.6, subd. (b).)  A course of conduct is further defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)   Thus, in a section 527.6 hearing, the court is “required to receive relevant testimony” regarding the alleged “course of conduct,” “subject only to such reasonable limitations as are necessary to conserve the expeditious nature of the harassment procedure set forth by ․ section 527.6.”  (Schraer, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 730, 733, fn. 6.)
The incidents forming the basis for Bharadwaj's application for a restraining order allegedly first began in 2007.   Despite counsel's argument that he needed to establish a pattern of harassment prior to the date the TRO was entered in March 2009 and Mears' harassing conduct was enjoined, and despite the fact that many of the alleged instances of harassment took place in 2007 and 2008, the trial court arbitrarily limited the evidence regarding instances of harassment to the three months prior to the date the TRO was entered.
Mears suggests that during Bharadwaj's testimony, the trial court withdrew its rulings excluding evidence of incidents prior to 2009.   At the outset of Bharadwaj's testimony, however, when she attempted to testify to intimidation and threats by Mears for the two years prior to the March 3, 2009 incident, the judge told Bharadwaj that she did not want to hear about events before 2009.   Although the court let Bharadwaj testify about two incidents in 2008, the court subsequently stated it was “not interested” in testimony about events in 2007.   Mears thus incorrectly asserts that the court made an “obvious change” in its ruling excluding evidence of incidents prior to 2009.
The trial court's ruling hampered Bharadwaj's ability to prove a pattern of harassment or “course of conduct.”   We conclude that the trial court committed an “error in law” in categorically excluding evidence of these prior events to establish a pattern of harassing conduct, without any articulation of a reasonable basis for such a ruling.
Taken individually, it is possible that none of the above acts of judicial misconduct or the error in excluding evidence of incidents prior to 2009 would constitute an error that “materially affect[ed] the substantial rights” of Bharadwaj such that a new trial was necessary. (§ 657).   However, “the cumulative effect of the trial judge's conduct requires reversal.”  (People v. Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1243.)  “The trial of a case should not only be fair in fact, but it should also appear to be fair.   And where the contrary appears, it shocks the judicial instinct to allow the judgment to stand.”   (Pratt v. Pratt (1903) 141 Cal. 247, 252.)   We therefore reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the superior court for a new trial before a different judge. (§ 187;  Hernandez v. Paicius (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 452, 455, disapproved on another ground in Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1006, fn. 4.) In doing so, we do not mean to suggest that the new judge should not impose “such reasonable limitations as are necessary to conserve the expeditious nature” of a section 527.6 proceeding.  (Schraer, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 733, fn. 6.) We also do not mean to suggest that Bharadwaj is or is not entitled to an injunction.   We only conclude that both parties must be treated fairly before a ruling on that issue is made.6
disposition
The judgment is reversed and remanded for a new trial, with directions to the presiding judge of the superior court to assign the matter to a different judge.   Each party shall each bear its own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
We concur:
FOOTNOTES
1.  FN1. All references to code sections herein are to the California Code of Civil Procedure.
2.  FN2. After agreeing to the stay, Bharadwaj sought to disqualify the original judge under sections 170.1, 170.3, and 170.6, contending that the court was biased against Bharadwaj and conducted a de facto settlement conference without her consent.   The judge denied the motion for disqualification, finding that it lacked merit, but ultimately recused herself in “the interest of justice” because she deemed it essential that the parties to a restraining order proceeding perceive they have been provided a full and fair hearing.
3.  FN3. California law calls for the disqualification of a judge based on the mere appearance of bias (§ 170.1, subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii);  Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1001), and thus imposes standards to protect against judicial bias that are more rigorous and expansive than the “ ‘ “constitutional floor” ’ ” set by the due process clause.  (Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1005.)   Therefore, most disputes over disqualification may be resolved under California's statutory law and “ ‘without resort to the Constitution.’ ”  (Ibid.) Here, however, Bharadwaj never sought the disqualification of the trial judge under section 170.1 based on the appearance of bias.
4.  FN4. While Bharadwaj complains of other conduct by the judge, such as refusing to permit other witnesses to testify, we find that Bharadwaj has not carried her burden of showing any misconduct on the judge's part in such rulings.
5.  FN5. Bharadwaj also asserts that the trial court erroneously interpreted section 527.6 to require proof of actual physical violence or the express threat of violence in order for an injunction against harassment to be issued.   As Mears points out, Bharadwaj failed to timely request a Statement of Decision (§ 632).   In the absence of a Statement of Decision, even if the record of the hearing indicates that the trial court was applying the wrong legal standard, we must assume that the trial court corrected any error and applied the proper legal standard in denying Bharadwaj's request for an injunction.  (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 269.)
6.  FN6. Because we necessarily reverse the grant of attorney's fees in favor of Mears as well, we need not reach Bharadwaj's contention that the award was otherwise erroneous.
WILLHITE, J.
EPSTEIN, P. J.SUZUKAWA, J.

Mary Cummins of Animal Advocates is a wildlife rehabilitator licensed by the California Department of Fish and Game. Mary Cummins is also a licensed real estate appraiser in Los Angeles, California.

Mary Cummins, Mary K. Cummins, Mary Katherine Cummins, Mary Cummins-Cobb, Mary, Cummins, Cobb, real estate, appraiser, appraisal, instructor, teacher, Los Angeles, Santa Monica, Beverly Hills, Pasadena, Brentwood, Bel Air, California, licensed, permitted, single family, condo, pud, hud, fannie mae, freddie mac, uspap, certified, residential, certified resident, apartment building, multi-family, commercial, industrial, expert witness, civil, criminal, orea, dre, insurance, bonded, experienced, bilingual, spanish, english, form, 1004, 2055, land, raw, acreage, vacant, insurance, cost, income approach, market analysis, comparative, theory, appraisal theory, cost approach, sales, matched pairs, plot, plat, map, diagram, photo, photographs, photography, rear, front, street, subject, comparable, sold, listed, active, pending, expired, cancelled, listing, mls, multiple listing service, claw, themls,

Take 3 Film Festival at Plaza de Cultural y Artes by Mary Cummins, Maria Rivera

Take 3 Film Festival presented by East LA Film Festival , Panamanian International Film Festival/LA and La Plaza de Cultura y Artes was hel...